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Domestic households account for a significant portion of energy consumption and carbon emissions in the United
Kingdom. Gains in energy and resource efficiency are undermined by the continuing rise in consumption. A multiu-
tility service company (MUSCo) could enable households to make efficiency improvements through energy technol-
ogies and demand management, thus reducing overall consumption. We present a system dynamics model for the
domestic energy demand and supply system in the United Kingdom, in which MUSCos compete with traditional
utility providers. The market transition toward a leasing contracted service is examined and various potential busi-
ness models explored. VC 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 000: 00–00, 2015
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1. INTRODUCTION
A
lthough there continue to be large gains in energy and
resource efficiency, overall energy consumption con-
tinues to grow: more consumption typically means
progress, such as rising living standards, gains in health and
welfare, and these lead to greater economic growth [1]. The
progressive reduction worldwide in energy intensity (the
ratio between consumption of primary energy and output
of goods and services) is largely due to continual pressure
to cut costs [2]. Further reductions in total energy usage
could be achieved by cutting losses within the energy sys-
tem, for example, in energy distribution [2], but we focus on
potentially greater improvements in domestic energy effi-
ciencies which ultimately reduce consumption while pro-
viding the same quality of domestic liveability. For the
purposes of our investigation, the householder may experi-
ence a real reduction in energy bills, but this is likely to be
marginal, and largely in respect of balancing continuous
energy price rises with reduced energy consumption. Any
significant real savings could result in undesirable rebound
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effects whereby the savings are spent on other energy con-
suming activities. In the transport sector, there is evidence
that fuel efficiency savings cause a rebound effect, an
increase in miles travelled, [Correction added on 3 August
2015, after first online publication: traveled changed to trav-
elled] of between 10% and 30% [1], so our aim is not to sim-
ply reduce energy bills.
UK domestic energy consumption rose by 16% between
1970 and 2012. In the 1970s, few homes had central heating
or owned the household appliances taken for granted today.
During this period, there were fundamental changes in
housing stock, an increase in insulation and draught proof-
ing, a rise in more energy efficient heating systems shifting
from coal to gas [2], all dampened by the growing number
of lights and variety of domestic appliances. Also, the num-
ber of homes increased by two fifths, with a fall in the aver-
age number of people per household, and so the average
household consumption per year has declined from 23,800
to 18,600 kWh [3]. However, the number of households will
increase by a fifth over the next quarter century creating
concerns for energy consumption growth. Several drivers
exist to improve the energy efficiency of the nation. They
include: reducing environmental impact using nonpollut-
ing, renewable resources [4] and improving the greenness
of fossil fuel use [5]; reducing the cost of energy, through
technological improvements [6], or by changing household
behaviors (demand) [7] or by engaging in community level
schemes to reduce per household resource usage through
meso-scale energy solutions [8].
Domestic homes account for 29% of energy consump-
tion [9] and more than a quarter of carbon dioxide emis-
sions in the United Kingdom [3]. The government’s
Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP) is now widely used
to measure the basic energy efficiency of homes. The aver-
age rating was just 43 in 2003 [10] reflecting that the hous-
ing stock is some of the oldest and most energy inefficient
in the Western world. Energy efficiency improvements in
previously inefficient homes are likely to lead to intentional
increases in temperatures with the benefit of thermal com-
fort in exchange for energy cost savings [11]. Furthermore,
technology efficiency ratings for domestic appliances are
used as key marketing tools by technology retailers and
some technologies can ‘‘automate’’ the behavioral habits of
consumers in the home to reduce energy costs. Examples
include, closing down of an appliance after x minutes of
lack of use, or energy nonuse/avoidance at peak times.
The [Correction added on 3 August 2015, after first
online publication: principal changed to principle] princi-
ple of avoiding energy costs via energy efficiencies under-
lies the proposal here. But it is recommended as an
alternative to the current domestic energy arrangements
of traditional utility product supply companies and house-
holder incentive schemes led by the government. A multi-
utility service company or MUSCo can help enable
households to make energy efficiencies via a rounded
package of energy technologies and energy demand man-
agement. The MUSCo uses a new business model to
improve energy efficiency through reduced resource use
by both technological improvements and behavioral con-
tracts with householders. The MUSCo profits through
scale procurement of technological appliances and by
assurances to energy suppliers of energy demand patterns
thereby avoiding gate closure demand. Fringe benefits for
the MUSCo could include householder penalties if they
demand more energy than their contracts provide; and
government incentives to support low emissions technolo-
gies helping to meet the Carbon Act. The householder is
locked-in to the MUSCo for the term of contract and a
revenue stream is assured.
There are several benefits to the householder. They are
financially no worse off because their energy costs are lower
(as the household is more efficient), their loan is tied to their
property and the total of energy costs and loan repayment
does not cost more than current energy bills. It is assumed
that energy costs will continue to rise. Householders have
not reduced their level of comfort and may have improved
levels of comfort with indirect benefits to health and well-
being. They also have efficient technological devices which
can reduce demand for other resource use, such as water or
heat. The household could not have acquired the technology
as cheaply as the MUSCo and they have peace of mind
because the MUSCo will lease it to the household and main-
tain it thereby ensuring it is in efficient working order.
In this article, we present a model for the transition of
the residential household population toward a leasing con-
tracted service. A population level perspective is adopted
and individual household characteristics are not addressed
in the current work. The importance of household heteroge-
neity in real-world social systems has been documented
[12] and this individualistic behavior is examined in the
service perspective paper in Ref. [13]. The current work sug-
gests that there is a ‘‘win-win’’ to energy efficiency, which
moves us toward sustainable consumption and the ability
to live better by consuming less and reduce our impact on
the environment in the process [14].
2. THE MODEL
The system we consider includes: people who live in var-
ious different types and sizes of house, comprising the
‘‘household’’; the levels of efficiency in resource use (energy
and water) of these households; traditional utility compa-
nies; and novel MUSCos. The importance of the MUSCo
will be in its ability to hasten the transition to a more effi-
cient residential housing sector, by reducing both resource
usage and greenhouse gas emissions. In the United King-
dom, the SAP rating is expressed on a scale of 1–100 [15],
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with higher values indicating better performance. Based on
this rating houses are assigned to one of seven bands, Table
1. To represent the energy performance of households in
the model, we construct 11 discrete levels of energy effi-
ciency, which represent mean efficiency percentages of
½0%; 10%; 20%;    ; 100%. This structure is used for compu-
tational convenience and could be mapped to the official
SAP energy bands given in Table 1.
The market will be composed of independent house-
holds, who receive resources from traditional utility firms
and are not tied into a contract. Two MUSCo-type firms are
represented in the model, which we label M2 and M3. Ini-
tially, it is assumed that a small population of households
have already upgraded their efficiency and switched to a
MUSCo. The initial household population consists of 28
million residential dwellings, Htotð0Þ5283106, 0.8% of
which are signed to a MUSCo and are equally distributed
between the two MUSCo firms and across all 11 efficiency
levels. The three distinct household subpopulations will be
denoted by HkðtÞ for k 5 1, 2, 3, representing independent
households provided with utility products via traditional
utility companies, those signed with M2 and those signed
withM3, respectively, such that, at any time t  0, we have
HTotðtÞ5
X3
k51
HkðtÞ:
Households vary widely on their resource use efficiency
and this is represented by distributing the initial house-
hold population across the range of efficiency bands, as
shown in Figure 1. More formally, each household is des-
ignated an initial efficiency grade i 2 ½0; 1; 2; . . . ; 10, repre-
senting the 11 efficiency percentage levels, and from
which it can independently self-finance an upgrade or
sign a contract with a MUSCo firm, such that the sum of
households belonging to service provider k at time t is
HkðtÞ5
X10
i50
Hki ðtÞ; for k51; 2; 3:
2.1. The Traditional Utility Market
Household dynamics evolve as a result of customers
investing in a house improvement scheme that will reduce
TABLE 1
SAP Ratings and Bands. Source: [15]
Rating Band
1220 G
21238 F
39254 E
55268 D
69280 C
81291 B
922100 A
FIGURE 1
The initial energy efficiency distribution of households.
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resource use. This decision will reduce future consumption
at a given fixed cost of improvement. The cost of improve-
ment will be greater if the existing efficiency is already high.
If the simple assumption is made that the difficulty and
cost of improving the current efficiency increases with the
level of efficiency already achieved, then each upgrade
increase of 10% will sequentially cost more and more. For
each 10% energy demand reduction (achieved by a 10% effi-
ciency upgrade), the cost will lie in the improved insulation
and domestic appliances that are needed to further opti-
mize resource usage. It is assumed that this cost is deter-
mined by the formula
Insj;i5Ins0
i2j
ð102iÞð102jÞ11 ;
which represents a household upgrade from efficiency
level j to i. Thus, the cost of the first 10% upgrade (from
0% to 10%) will satisfy Ins0;15Ins0=91. For example, con-
sider a scenario where the initial 10% upgrade costs £400,
then the cost of larger incremental upgrades from a base
of 0% will increase as displayed in Figure 2, such that an
improvement from 0% to 100% would cost in excess of
£300,000. Each step of improvement yields a saving on the
cost of consumption, but the cost of the extra insulation
and appliances rises steeply. Thus, a household with 0%
efficiency and average annual utility costs of £2400 could
cut costs by £240 per year by investing £400, yielding a
high return on investment of 60%. Alternatively, consider
the case of a household shifting from 60% to 70%, then
the return on investment would be approximately 9%,
which is less but still reasonably good. However, as the
cost of energy rises the return on investment will also
increase. For example, if the cost rose at 3% per annum
for 40 years, then it would cost approximately 3.5 times
more, yielding a return on investment of over 25%.
The dynamics of household improvement will be gov-
erned by the investment in better insulation and appliances
that will give a return resulting from reduced energy costs.
The model developed here will describe the decision of
households to make an investment to improve their energy
efficiency, using the economies resulting from reduced
resource use to pay for it. Clearly, the higher energy costs
are the more incentive there is to make efficiency improve-
ments. Over the range of efficiency levels 0–100%, the net
benefit over a 10 year interval for a household increasing
its energy efficiency from level j to i will be the percentage
reduction of use times the energy cost, minus the cost of
attaining that level of insulation, such that
Benefiti;j5Peði2jÞ2Insj;i; (1)
where PeðtÞ is the mean annual household energy costs at
the present time. This expression yields a surface of bene-
fit, representing the attraction of attaining a particular
level of household improvement (% efficiency), Figure 3. A
household will be attracted to move from j to i if the net
benefit is large, Table 2. It is assumed that this benefit
impacts a household’s attraction to a given improvement
according to the following expression
FIGURE 2
Nonlinear increase in household efficiency upgrade costs from 0%, at a cost of £400 for the initial 10% upgrade.
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Atti;j5e
Benefitij : (2)
2.2. The multiutility service companies
A MUSCo can offer a household reduced utility costs
while offering the same level of comfort as before, but
with much greater resource use efficiency. In turn, a
household must sign a contract with the firm. A MUSCo
will assume responsibility for upgrading the insulation
and installing high quality appliances that will reduce
overall energy needs, and will simply charge the custom-
ers an additional sum per month. If a 10 year contract
period is considered, then the calculations are the same as
before, but now the MUSCo pays for the upgrading work
instead of the household. Naturally, the MUSCo can
undertake this work for considerably less cost than that
which a private customer would pay. To attract customers
to this new service, a MUSCo could choose to charge less
for each unit of energy than the traditional utility suppli-
ers. So, instead of the profit being simply Pe2Ce (i.e., price
of energy—cost of energy), a MUSCo could charge, for
example, ðPe1CeÞ=2 to the customer and still make a
profit on the supply as well as on the insulation and appli-
ances it installs. For a customer, who moves from effi-
ciency level j to i on signing a contract with a MUSCo,
this means a reduced consumption and at the lower cost
TABLE 2
The Net Benefit, Over a 10 Year Period, of Upgrading from Efficiency Level j to Efficiency Level i in a Traditional Utility Household. Values Shown are
for an Annual Energy Cost of £2000 and an Insulation/Appliance Cost of £300 for the First 10% Upgrade
i
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
j 0 £0 £1,700 £3,325 £4,846 £6,209 £7,323 £8,004 £7,835 £5,600 2£4,336 2£253,000
1 £0 £0 £1,626 £3,146 £4,510 £5,626 £6,310 £6,150 £3,942 2£5,840 2£227,700
2 £0 £0 £0 £1,521 £2,885 £4,002 £4,690 £4,540 £2,364 2£7,233 2£202,400
3 £0 £0 £0 £0 £1,365 £2,483 £3,175 £3,036 £900 2£8,475 2£177,100
4 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £1,119 £1,816 £1,689 2£400 2£9,500 2£151,800
5 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £700 £587 2£1,445 2£10,200 2£126,500
6 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 2£100 2£2,066 2£10,380 2£101,200
7 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 2£1900 2£9,650 2£75,900
8 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 2£7,100 2£50,600
9 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 2£25,300
10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0
FIGURE 3
The net gain (over 10 years) for the action of increasing household energy efficiency from j to i. (a) Annual energy costs of £2000, initial 10% upgrade
costs of £300. (b) Annual energy costs of £1200, initial 10% upgrade costs of £200.
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of ðPe1CeÞ=2 instead of Pe. The charge must also incorpo-
rate the costs of improved insulation and appliances, to
be distributed over the lifetime of the contract which, of
course, the MUSCo could purchase in bulk at a reduced
cost, and sell to the customer for Insmusj;i 5dInsj;i, where
d < 1. The net benefit for households signing up to a
MUSCo can thus be written as
Benefitmusi;j 5Peð102jÞ2
Pe1Ce
2
ð102iÞ2Insmusj;i ; (3)
and it is assumed that MUSCos charge 30% less for house-
hold upgrades, that is d50:7, and a household’s attraction
to a MUSCo is calculated as
Attmusi;j 5e
Benefitmusij : (4)
This yields considerably more net return for a MUSCo
household than those that remain independent, Table 3. It
is implicitly assumed that the two MUSCo firms are
equally attractive to customers, whereby they charge the
same price for energy and household upgrades. Other
strategies could be readily investigated by defining firm-
specific attraction matrices.
2.3. The Energy Efficiency Market
Market dynamics are driven by households increasing
efficiency, either independently or by signing up to a
MUSCo that does it for them. By moving from a market
where households independently choose and fit their own
insulation and appliances, to a system where service com-
panies take care of both energy supply and the insulation/
appliances in houses, we observe a market innovation that
brings energy supply and demand together within a serv-
ice market.
The initial distribution of households along the energy
efficiency spectrum is shown in Figure 1. Now, consider,
for example, efficiency level 4. Households in levels j 2 ½0;
1; 2; 3 can choose to upgrade to i 5 4 and, similarly,
households in level j 5 4 can choose to upgrade to levels
i 2 ½5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10, Figure 4. This upgrade can be done as
either a noncontracted independent household, Hk51i , or
as a contracted MUSCo household, Hk52;3i . The household
populations at levels i and j change because either house-
holds at j are ‘‘captured’’ by salespeople for traditional util-
ity companies, denoted by Y1, or by MUSCo salespeople,
denoted by Y2;3. This capture depends on the relative
attractivity of i as opposed to j, which is given by Eqs. (2)
and (4). The model considers both independent customers
and also customers that sign up to two distinct MUSCo
firms, M2 and M3.
The 33 distinct household subpopulations, spread across
3 firms and 11 efficiency levels, will evolve in time due to
interactions with salespeople. A generalized equation for
the household dynamics can be written in the form
dHki
dt
5bHki 1D
1Hki 1D
2Hki ; for k51; 2; 3; (5)
TABLE 3
The Net Benefit of Improving Efficiency from Level j to Level i Through a MUSCo. Values Shown are for an Annual Energy Cost of £2000 and an Insula-
tion/Appliance Cost of £300 for the First 10% Upgrade
i
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
j 0 £0 £2,240 £3,928 £5,542 £7,046 £8,376 £9,403 £9,834 £8,820 £2,414 2£171,100
1 £0 £0 £2,138 £3,752 £5,257 £6,588 £7,617 £8,055 £7,059 £762 2£153,990
2 £0 £0 £0 £2,014 £3,520 £4,851 £5,883 £6,328 £5,355 2£813 2£136,880
3 £0 £0 £0 £0 £1,855 £3,188 £4,223 £4,675 £3,730 2£2,282 2£119,770
4 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £1,633 £2,671 £3,132 £2,220 2£3,600 2£102,660
5 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £1,290 £1,761 £888 2£4,690 2£85,550
6 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £680 2£146 2£5,416 2£68,440
7 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 2£630 2£5,505 2£51,330
8 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 2£4,320 2£34,220
9 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 2£17,110
10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0
FIGURE 4
The household transitions into and out off efficiency level 4.
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where b represents the growth rate of the household pop-
ulation due to construction, and is chosen to yield an
approximate growth of 2.5% in housing stock over 10
years. The expressions D1Hki and D
2Hki represent the
increase and decrease, respectively, in each subpopulation
due to sales. In order for a traditional utility provider to
sign a customer (for at least a single model time step)
there is little effort required. In contrast, each salesperson
for a MUSCo, Y2;3, could potentially take a longer time to
get a household to sign up to a long term contract, as
opposed to a single utility sale by Y1. This ‘‘contact time’’
per household that sales staff expend on selling a contract
is denoted by sk, for k 2 ½1; 2; 3. Various scenarios could
be considered in which, for example, MUSCo sales take
longer (s1 < s2;3) or MUSCo firms operate different sales
strategies (s2 6¼ s3). For simplicity, it is assumed that all
firms contact time is identical, such that, sk5s5Dt; 8k
(i.e., one model time step). To express the change in cus-
tomer numbers, due to the interaction of households and
salespeople, the following general form is adopted
cYkH
k
12csHk
;
where c is the number of household contacts per sales-
person per unit time, fixed at c52:531025. This expres-
sion incorporates the idea that for high numbers of
potential customers, the rate of recruitment is approxi-
mately proportional to the number of salespeople avail-
able, but when potential customers are scarce, the rate
depends primarily on the encounters between salespeo-
ple and customers. Equation (5) can be discretized to
obtain
Hki ðtÞ5Hki ðt2DtÞ1Dt½bHki 1D1Hki 1D2Hki ðt2DtÞ for
k51; 2; 3:
In addition, bounding conditions are required to con-
fine households to the 11 defined efficiency
levels. For k 5 1 (i.e., independent households receiv-
ing utilities from traditional firms) we define, at any
time t,
D2H1i 5
2
cY1H
1
i
11csH1i
X10
j5i11
fAttj;i2 cY2H1i
11csH1i
X10
j5i
fAttmusj;i 2 cY3H1i11csH1i
X10
j5i
fAttmusj;i ; for i50 . . . 9
2
cY2H
1
10
11csH110
fAttmus10;102 cY3H11011csH110 fAttmus10;10; for i510:
8>>><>>>:
D1H1i 5
0; for i50Xi21
j50
cY1H
1
j
11csH1j
fAtti;j; for i51 . . . 10;
8><>:
where fAtt and fAttmus represent the probabilities of inde-
pendently upgrading household efficiency from level i to
level j and switching to a MUSCo, respectively, which are
readily calculated form the normalized attraction
matrices,
fAtt5 AttP10
i50
P10
j50
Atti;j
and fAttmus5 AttmusP10
i50
P10
j50
Attmusi;j
:
Similarly, for k 2 ½2; 3 (i.e., households signed to MUSCo
firms M2 and M3) we define, at any time t,
D2Hki 5
2
cYkH
k
i
11csHki
X10
j5i11
fAttmusj;i for i50 . . . 9
0 for i510:
8><>:
D1Hki
5
cYkH
1
0
11csH10
fAttmus0;0 ; for i50
Xi21
j50
cYkH
k
j
11csHkj
fAttmusi;j 1Xi
j50
cYkH
1
j
11csH1j
fAttmusi;j ; for i51 . . . 10:
8>>><>>>:
We, thus, calculate the net change in the number of
households in each level of efficiency resulting from
inflows from below and losses to above.
The ability of firms to sign potential customers is
implicitly linked with the size of their respective sale
forces. In reality, this would be a complex function of the
internal economies and strategies of a firm. We adopt the
assumption that the effort to sign new customers is
affected by the number of potential customers, which are
the independent uncontracted households
P
i H
1
i . Thus,
the sales staff will grow with the fraction of free house-
holds, and the staff numbers at time t will be given by
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YkðtÞ5Ykðt2DtÞ1Dt ck
P
i H
1
i
Htot
20:1
 
12
Yk
50; 000
  
ðt2DtÞ
for k51; 2; 3;
(6)
where a ceiling of 50,000 has been applied to the staff
numbers, which grow at a rate of ck. Also, it is assumed
that, when the population of independent households falls
below 10% of the total housing stock, staff numbers are
reduced to reflect the smaller pool of potential customers.
Finally, it remains to determine how the price of energy
affects household attractiveness to the different firms and
efficiency levels. This is assumed to grow exponentially in
time following
PeðtÞ5Peð0Þet ;
where  is chosen to yield a 2% increase per annum in
mean household energy costs and the initial price of
energy in 2014, Peð0Þ, is fixed at £2000 per annum.
2.4. MUSCo Strategies
Clearly, households profit by signing to a MUSCo but,
of course, it is necessary that the MUSCos also make prof-
its to successfully invade this new market of utility serv-
ices. Firms’ [Correction added on 3 August 2015, after first
online publication: Firm’s changed to Firms’] profits can
be calculated for different strategies on energy price
reduction and discounts on insulation costs. The operat-
ing profits of the United Kingdom’s largest energy supply
companies vary over time but appear to be approximately
5% at present, Table 4. This implies that the difference
between the price, Pe, and the cost, Ce, of energy would,
in fact, be only 5%. The MUSCo must, therefore, offer a
monthly charge that is equivalent to a price between 95%
TABLE 4
The Revenues, Costs, and Profits of the UK’s Six Largest Energy
Companies [17]
£/Customer/Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Average revenue £1043 £1063 £1006 £1174 £1225
Wholesale costs £621 £588 £537 £612 £628
Other costs £291 £288 £294 £354 £392
Supplier costs £123 £152 £146 £154 £157
Profits £8 £35 £30 £53 £48
FIGURE 5
Energy efficiency distribution of households (in thousands) displayed at 10 year intervals. Results shown are calculated for an annual energy cost of
£2000 and an insulation/appliance cost of £550 for the first 10% upgrade.
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and 100% of the traditional providers, that is, Ce50:95Pe.
Thus, the benefit for customers comes from the fact that
the MUSCo can perform the upgrade at a discount and
can buy efficient appliances in bulk. The profits made by
the different suppliers over time can be readily calculated.
For the traditional firm, it is the quantity of energy deliv-
ered multiplied by the difference between the cost and the
price per unit, thus, the total profit made at time t
satisfies
Pr1ðtÞ5Pr1ðt2DtÞ1Dt ðPe2CeÞ
Xi510
i50
12
i
10
 
H1i
" #
ðt2DtÞ
;
For a MUSCo, the profit is determined from the monthly
charge to its customers minus the cost of buying the
energy. In addition, it is assumed that household effi-
ciency upgrades would yield 10% of the cost as a profit to
the MUSCo. This is the cost of improving the household
efficiency from j to i, which will be at a discount due to
the scale of the activity. The charge needs only to reflect
the cost of energy, plus a percentage profit on the cost of
insulation/appliance upgrades. Thus, at any time t, the
MUSCo profit will satisfy
PrkðtÞ5Prkðt2DtÞ1Dt Pe1Ce
2
2Ce
 
12
i
10
 Xi510
i50
Hki 1Pr
k
Ins
" #
ðt2DtÞ
for k52; 3;
where, PrkIns represents the profit made from selling/instal-
ling more efficient insulation/appliances and is dependent
on the number of new customers attained by a MUSCo in
the time interval Dt,
PrkIns50:1
X10
i50
Xi
j50
Insmusj;i
cYkðH1j 1Hkj Þ
11csH1j
fAttmusi;j :
As profit is implicitly dependent on the sales force of a
firm, which is adjusted at each time step following (6), we
must also establish initial staff numbers and their growth
rates over time, ck. As MUSCos are a newly emerging serv-
ice in the model, it is assumed that their initial work force
is considerably smaller than that of the traditional pro-
vider, such that Y15500 and Y2;35200. It is assumed that
M1 grows its sales capacity at the same rate as the tradi-
tional firm, c15c251:25 per year, and M3 grows at the
faster rate of c351:5 per year.
3. RESULTS
The model is run over a time interval of 40 years from
2014 to 2054. The time-step, Dt, is chosen to yield 1000
iterations within this interval. The distribution of house-
holds moves from an average centred on 30% efficiency,
Figure 1, to an average centred on 80–90%, Figure 5. As
the model runs forward in time, there are improvements
in the efficiency distribution of households both as inde-
pendent buyers of utilities, who pay for their own house
improvements and there are also customers captured by
the MUSCos, who are signed up for long term contracts.
They choose this solution because of the reduced overall
cost of energy and also the reduced cost of insulation and
high quality appliances that a MUSCo can offer.
We see from Figures 6 and 7 that the profits available
to MUSCos are potentially greater than those of traditional
utility providers as a result of the additional profits made
from the insulation and appliance improvement pro-
gramme that they include. In essence, some 15 million
households are going to need improved insulation and
better appliances, so that the profits from these activities
can be harvested by the MUSCos. Obviously, this is only a
‘‘temporary’’ situation in that it corresponds to a basic
FIGURE 6
The profits made by the traditional utility firms and the MUSCos. Results shown are calculated for an annual energy cost of £2000 and an insulation/
appliance cost of £550 for the first 10% upgrade.
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improvement in thermal insulation and energy efficiency
for UK housing, which once performed will inevitably
need periodic renewal. Clearly, some of the profits that
household improvement companies would have made in
this UK wide energy efficiency improvement will now be
included in MUSCo profits. For consumers, the attraction
of MUSCos will be in their offering a service which means
that consumers do not have to organize and self-finance
household improvements.
Clearly, as energy demand decreases the traditional
energy companies will inevitably have reduced turnover
and profits. MUSCos, however, may be able to add serv-
ices to the initial energy/utility service and use the long
term relationships with customers to develop other areas
of household management.
4. DISCUSSION
We have developed a systems dynamics model of the
domestic energy demand and supply system in the United
Kingdom. The model examines the potential for a new
type of firm, the MUSCo, to enter the energy supply mar-
ket. In essence, instead of just simply selling energy to
households, the MUSCo proposes to manage the upgrad-
ing of existing insulation and domestic appliances to
reduce household energy requirements, while maintaining
the same comfort levels of the occupants. These energy
services are offered under the terms of a long term con-
tract where the household simply pays a regular monthly
charge and the MUSCo supplies the energy, having raised
the efficiency performance of the house to an agreed level.
This action unites what are initially two separate tasks; (i)
to supply energy, and (ii) to insulate and place high effi-
ciency appliances in the house. As both of these actions
are undertaken by the MUSCo, it would be possible to
profit from both operations and, more importantly for the
domestic consumer, to offer a cheaper route to energy
efficiency than is possible by private self-financed
improvements.
We considered a market scenario, where energy price
rises over 40 years are assumed to be at an average of
approximately 2% per year. This is not an unreasonable
assumption and, of course, other possible scenarios could
be easily explored. Household choice is modeled using an
exponential function that translates the net gain/loss of a
possible action into the number of households that
choose that action. This functional form is commonly
used to model consumer choice [16] and it adequately
represents the idea that the household decision process
will proceed by the most rewarding actions first, such that
it becomes increasingly costly to make a given percentage
increase in efficiency. Other functions could be used to
incorporate additional issues such as the impact of neigh-
borhood adoptions and economics of scale. However, the
scope of this work is the average behavior of the popula-
tion and, for our purposes, the exponential preference
function provides a sufficient representation of the hetero-
geneous nature of the real system. Our model provides
insight into how the energy services market could contrib-
ute to the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions due to
reduced domestic energy consumption, which would aid
the United Kingdom in meeting its 2050 target of at least
an 80% reduction in emissions (from the 1990 baseline).
Furthermore, the model could help MUSCo firms to
explore different possible market strategies and the bal-
ance between immediate profits and the longer term suc-
cess that may arise from faster expansion. Similarly, we
could explore the advantages and disadvantages of differ-
ent strategies in targeting sales teams according to specific
household characteristics (e.g., ownership, occupancy,
wealth, current state of insulation and appliance use, type
of heating).
Of course in reality, the domestic energy demand
would be changing because of several factors such as the
acquisition of electric vehicles (and their consequent
charging), and a switch perhaps from gas toward heat
pumps. In addition to these ideas, instead of just model-
ing the demand side of households, we could also con-
sider competing companies that would offer different
possible ‘‘bundles’’ of services to households. The MUSCos
could use different strategies such as different contractual
lengths, different discount rates, and different profit mar-
gins. We could also potentially investigate the most favor-
able neighborhood for targeting by a MUSCo, and thus
improve the success rate of a MUSCo. Such different types
of competing business models and relevant policies,
FIGURE 7
The profit per household made by the traditional utility firms and
the MUSCos. Results shown are calculated for an annual energy
cost of £2000 and an insulation/appliance cost of £550 for the first
10% upgrade.
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actions, and changing circumstances (subsidies, rising
energy costs, etc.) could be explored and provide insight
on the ways that the overall system can maintain comfort
and convenience levels while greatly reducing carbon
emissions, energy, and water consumption. The transition
toward a ‘‘leasing’’ and ‘‘contracted service’’ type of opera-
tion can be modeled, as well as the long term consequen-
ces for design, maintenance, and overall efficiencies. The
end of life resource recovery of leased products could also
generate profits for the MUSCo. In many ways, we have
moved toward a ‘‘life cycle analysis’’ of the whole sector to
see how carbon emissions, energy, and resource efficiency
can be improved in a sustainable way.
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